Download of the Week

The Download of the Week is “Artificial Intelligence and the Rule of Law” by Azziz Z. Huq (University of Chicago School of Law). Here is the abstract:

This book chapter examines an interaction between technological shocks and the “rule of law.” It does so by analyzing the implications of a class of loosely related computational technologies termed “machine learning” (ML) or, rather less precisely “artificial intelligence” (AI). These tools are presently employed in the pre-adjudicative phase of enforcing of the laws, for example facilitating the selection of targets for tax and regulatory investigations.

Two general questions respecting the rule of law arise from these developments. The more immediately apparent one is whether these technologies, when integrated into the legal system, are themselves compatible or in conflict with the rule of law. Depending on which conception of the rule of law is deployed, the substitution of machine decision-making for human judgment can kindle objections based on transparency, predictability, bias, and procedural fairness. A first purpose of this chapter is to examine ways in which this technological shock poses such challenges. The interaction between the normative ambitions of the rule of law and ML technologies, I will suggest, is complex and ambiguous. In many cases, moreover, the more powerful normative objection to technology arises less from the bare fact of its objection, and more from the socio-political context in which that adoption occurred and the dynamic effect of technology on background disparities of power and resources. ML’s adoption likely exacerbates differences of social power and status in ways that place the rule of law under strain.

The second question posed by new AI and ML technologies has also not been extensively discussed. Yet it is perhaps of more profound significance. Rather than focusing on the compliance of new technologies with rule-of-law values, it hinges on the implications of ML and AI technologies for how the rule of law itself is conceived or implemented. Many of the canonical discussions of the rule of law—including Dicey’s and Waldron’s—entangle a conceptual definition and a series of institutional entailments. Many assume that the rule of law requires the specific institutional form of courts. They presumably also posit human judges exercising discretion and making judgments as necessary rather than optional. For these institutional entailments of the rule of law, a substitution of human for ML technologies likely has destabilizing implications. It sharpens the question whether the abstract concept of the rule of law needs to be realized by a particular institutional form. It raises a question whether instead technological change might demand amendments to relationship between the concept(s) and the practice of the rule of law. For pre-existing normative concepts and their practical, institutional correlates may no longer hold under conditions of technological change. At the very least then, specification of institutional forms of the rule of law under such conditions raises challenges not just as a practical matter but also in terms of legal theory.

Frischmann on Common Sense Commons

Brett M. Frischmann (Villanova University – School of Law) has posted “Common Sense Commons: The Case of Commonsensical Social Norms” (Governing Markets as Knowledge Commons, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This chapter examines common sense, an important domain of social knowledge. Common sense helps us effectively engage with each other and our complex world, and it often functions as social infrastructure for everyday market transactions and social interactions. Common sense does not mean universal, true, or even accurate; it often is culturally contingent, varied, and erroneous (i.e., common nonsense). The chapter explores governance challenges and the dynamic relationships between common sense, social norms, and technology.

Recommended.

Lemley on The Contradictions of Platform Regulation

Mark A. Lemley (Stanford Law School) has posted “The Contradictions of Platform Regulation” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Everyone wants to regulate the big tech companies. The desire to regulate the private actors that control so much of our lives is understandable, and some ideas for regulation make sense. But the political consensus around regulating the tech industry is illusory. While everyone wants to regulate big tech, it turns out that they want to do so in very different, indeed contradictory, ways.

These contradictions of platform regulation mean that it will be very hard to turn anti-tech popular sentiment into actual regulation, because the actual regulations some people want are anathema to others. They suggest caution in imposing regulation and an awareness of the difficult tradeoffs that are involved. But they also suggest a way forward: introducing competition to reduce the influence the tech giants have over our lives.

Scherer & Neesam on Why Socio-Technological Conditions Lead to Organized Immaturity and What to Do About It 

Andreas Georg Scherer (University of Zurich – IBW Department of Business Administration) and Christina Neesham (Newcastle University Business School) have posted “New Challenges to Enlightenment: Why Socio-Technological Conditions Lead to Organized Immaturity and What to Do About It” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Organized immaturity can be defined as the erosion of the individual’s capacity for public use of reason, due to surveillance and control mechanisms of socio-technological systems, ideologies, or autocratic leaders and regimes. Such pushbacks on the Enlightenment have been a concern for philosophers and social theorists. Today, technological advancements of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (such as social media, Internet of Things, smart cities) are inducing new and even more sophisticated forms of organized immaturity. Left to their own devices, systems initially designed to meet human needs tend to slide from service to paternalism, with undesirable reductionist, totalizing and infantilizing effects. To counteract the effects of organized immaturity on individuals and society, we suggest two social mechanisms. Firstly, disorganizing (or anti-organizing) organized immaturity seeks to protect or increase negative freedom (‘freedom from’) of individuals. Secondly, organizing individual and collective maturity emphasizes the strengthening of positive freedom (‘freedom to’) of individuals as well as social groups and collectives.

Goelzhauser, Kassow, and Rice on Supreme Court Case Complexity

Greg Goelzhauser (Utah State University – Department of Political Science), Benjamin Kassow (University of North Dakota-Department of Political Science and Public Administration), and Douglas Rice (University of Massachusetts Amherst – Department of Political Science) have posted “Measuring Supreme Court Case Complexity” (Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Forthcoming) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Case complexity is central to the study of judicial politics. The dominant measures of Supreme Court case complexity use information on legal issues and provisions observed post-decision. As a result, scholars using these measures to study merits stage outcomes such as bargaining, voting, separate opinion production, and opinion content introduce post-treatment bias and exacerbate endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, existing issue measures are not valid proxies for complexity. Leveraging information on issues and provisions extracted from merits briefs, we develop a new latent measure of Supreme Court case complexity. This measure maps with the prevailing understanding of the underlying concept while mitigating inferential threats that hamper empirical evaluations. Our brief-based measurement strategy is generalizable to other contexts where it is important to generate exogenous and pre-treatment indicators for use in explaining merits decisions.

Coupette, Beckedorf, Hartung, Bonmarito & Katz on Measuring Law Over Time

Corinna Coupette (Max Planck Institute for Informatics), Janis Beckedorf (Heidelberg University Faculty of Law) Dirk Hartung
Bucerius Center for Legal Technology & Data Science; Stanford Codex Center, Michael James Bommarito
(Bommarito Consulting, LLC; Licensio, LLC; Stanford Center for Legal Informatics; Michigan State College of Law), and Daniel Martin Katz (Illinois Tech – Chicago Kent College of Law; Stanford CodeX; Bucerius Center for Legal Technology & Data Science) have posted “Measuring Law Over Time: A Network Analytical Framework with an Application to Statutes and Regulations in the United States and Germany” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

How do complex social systems evolve in the modern world? This question lies at the heart of social physics, and network analysis has proven critical in providing answers to it. In recent years, network analysis has also been used to gain a quantitative understanding of law as a complex adaptive system, but most research has focused on legal documents of a single type, and there exists no unified framework for quantitative legal document analysis using network analytical tools. Against this background, we present a comprehensive framework for analyzing legal documents as multi-dimensional, dynamic document networks. We demonstrate the utility of this framework by applying it to an original dataset of statutes and regulations from two different countries, the United States and Germany, spanning more than twenty years (1998–2019). Our framework provides tools for assessing the size and connectivity of the legal system as viewed through the lens of specific document collections as well as for tracking the evolution of individual legal documents over time. Implementing the framework for our dataset, we find that at the federal level, the American legal system is increasingly dominated by regulations, whereas the German legal system remains governed by statutes. This holds regardless of whether we measure the systems at the macro, the meso, or the micro level.

Weber on ‘The Legal Singularity’

Robert F. Weber (Georgia State University College of Law) has posted “Will the ‘Legal Singularity’ Hollow Out Law’s Normative Core?” (Michigan Technology Law Review, Vol. 27, 2020) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This Article undertakes a critical examination of the unintended consequences for the legal system if we arrive at the futurist dream of a legal singularity—the moment when predictive, mass-data technologies evolve to create a perfectly predictable, algorithmically expressed legal system bereft of all legal uncertainty. It argues that although the singularity would surely enhance the efficiency of the legal system in a narrow sense, it would also undermine the rule of law, a bedrock institution of any liberal legal order and a key source of the legal system’s legitimacy. It would do so by dissolving the normative content of the two core pillars of the rule of law: the predictability principle and the universality principle, each of which has traditionally been conceived as a bulwark against arbitrary government power.

The futurists heralding the legal singularity privilege a weak-form predictability principle that emphasizes providing notice to legal subjects about the content of laws over a strong-form variant that also emphasizes the prevention of arbitrary governmental action. Hence, an inattentive and hurried embrace of predictive technologies in service of the (only weak-form) predictability principle will likely attenuate the rule of law’s connection to the deeper (strong-form) predictability principle. The legal singularity will also destabilize law’s universality principle, by reconceiving of legal subjects as aggregations of data points rather than as individual members of a polity. In so doing, it will undermine the universality principle’s premise that the differences among legal subjects are outweighed by what we—or, better still, “We the People” who are, as Blackstone put it, the “community in general”—have in common. A cautionary directive emerges from this analysis: that lawyers should avoid an uncritical embrace of predictive technologies in pursuit of a shrunken ideal of predictability that might ultimately require them to throw aside much of the normative ballast that has kept the liberal legal order stable and afloat.