Sella-Villa on Regulating AI as a Person?

David Sella-Villa (U South Carolina Joseph F. Rice Law) has posted “Regulating AI as a Person?” (34 Mich. St. Int’l L. Rev. (Forthcoming 2026)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The world’s first AI Treaty sets out a bold agenda for AI regulation. The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence opened for signature in September 2024. It commits signatories, including the United States, to regulate AI in ways that promotes human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Yet the treaty offers little specific guidance on implementation. This Article applies Professors Crootof and Ard’s Structuring Techlaw approach to the AI Treaty to illuminate options for regulating generative artificial intelligence (GenAI).

The analysis reveals that GenAI’s greatest source of legal uncertainty lies not in its data or hardware—which existing transnational legal regimes largely address—but in its algorithms. Unlike traditional regulatory targets, GenAI algorithms operate through probabilistic processes immune to the sanctions and incentives legal systems typically deploy. These algorithms process data throughout GenAI’s lifecycle, creating normative uncertainties about whether existing laws can accomplish their intended aims. The AI Treaty’s procedural requirements suggest a precautionary regulatory approach.

In developing new regulations consistent with the AI Treaty, the Structuring Techlaw approach suggests that policymakers look to an analogous legal regime. To match GenAI’s features and the AI Treaty’s goals, this regime must assess the provenance, capabilities, and potential impacts of its regulatory object; combine bright-line rules with case-by-case assessments; operate across multiple institutions and jurisdictions; and account for changing circumstances over time. Immigration law – or the regulation of people in new contexts – emerges as a powerful analogy for the regulation of GenAI. Immigration law could provide a foundation for understanding how signatories might implement lifecycle-based regulation that addresses algorithmic data processing’s unique challenges to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

Gervais on Automating the Fourth Estate: Artificial Intelligence and the Governance of Democratic Knowledge

Daniel J. Gervais (Vanderbilt U Law) has posted “Automating the Fourth Estate: Artificial Intelligence and the Governance of Democratic Knowledge” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Democratic governance depends on institutions that produce, circulate, and contest public knowledge under conditions of accountable human judgment. Generative artificial intelligence is reshaping those institutions from within, introducing what this article terms epistemic automation: the substitution of human judgment in the generation of publicly authoritative knowledge by computational systems optimised for scale. Taking journalism, and specifically the institutional conditions of quality journalism, as a paradigmatic case of democratic epistemic infrastructure, and intellectual property law as an analytical lens, the article argues that governance frameworks oriented toward informational outputs, rather than the conditions of their production, risk aligning silently with the dynamics of automation and displacing the institutional arrangements that sustain democratic knowledge. It advances a human-centred alternative in which accountable epistemic agency retains institutional significance independent of output quality, and develops an institutional mechanism, editorial certification, to preserve that link.

Fink et al. on The Constitutional Foundation of Explanation Rights in EU Digital Regulation: A Contextual Approach

Melanie Fink (Leiden U Europa Institute) and Simona Demkova (Leiden Law Europa Institute) have posted “The Constitutional Foundation of Explanation Rights in EU Digital Regulation: A Contextual Approach” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

EU digital regulation increasingly requires organisations to explain automated decisions affecting individuals. Yet explanation rights across instruments such as the GDPR, DSA, and AI Act have developed without systematic attention to their shared constitutional foundations or their relationship to parallel rights. This fragmentation creates two problems. First, the absence of common principles undermines coherence across explanation requirements, weakening legal certainty and enforcement. Second, constitutional and sectoral explanation rights possess distinct strengths that could inform one another, but when developed in isolation they fail to reach their full potential. 

This Article develops a contextual approach that grounds sectoral explanation rights in the constitutional duty to state reasons, operating at two levels: legislative design and interpretation of existing law. This contextual approach identifies and then draws upon the complementary strengths that constitutional and sectoral rights possess: constitutional principles are valueoriented, resilient against legislative and technological change, and bind public authorities across all decision-making contexts, while sectoral provisions offer domain-specific precision, regulatory flexibility, and functional reach to private actors.

Through two scenarios involving organisations facing overlapping obligations and explanation duties distributed across AI decision-making chains, the Article demonstrates how these strengths enable constitutional and sectoral rights to reinforce each other. Sectoral provisions extend constitutional values to private actors, while constitutional principles fill gaps where sectoral legislation does not apply and provide substantive standards that give concrete meaning to open-textured concepts. While interpretation can mitigate practical challenges and create coherence, the contextual approach demonstrates why future explanation requirements must be grounded in constitutional reasoning principles and coordinated with parallel sectoral provisions from the outset.

Fagan on The Governance of Clinical Trial Data

Frank Fagan (South Texas College Law Houston) has posted “The Governance of Clinical Trial Data” (Washington Journal of Law & Policy, forthcoming 2026) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Clinical trial results are among the most authoritative inputs in biomedical research and are increasingly reused as training, calibration, and evaluation data for AI systems. Yet a large share of completed trials, especially small academic studies, pilot projects, and early-phase experiments, never disclose their findings. These omissions distort meta-analyses, hide negative results, and silently propagate upstream bias into AI models. Existing enforcement tools, including FDA civil penalties and NIH grant sanctions, work tolerably well for high-stakes commercial trials when used, but fail across the long tail, where investigators lack the resources or incentives to upload results once grant funds expire. 

This Article reframes clinical-trial transparency as a training-data governance problem and proposes a complementary solution: modest fixed cost-offsets for compliant uploads, funded through a two-tier access model. Public summaries on ClinicalTrials.gov would remain free, while a licensed API would provide harmonized, machine-readable datasets to high-volume users such as insurers, pharmaceutical consortia, and AI developers. Aligning the distribution of costs and benefits makes transparency feasible for resource-constrained investigators and sustainable for the analytic institutions that depend on complete, unbiased data. The result is a light-touch institutional architecture that preserves fragile trial evidence and strengthens the reliability of both biomedical research and AI health systems.

Eisen et al. on Data Centers’ Data Problem

Joel B. Eisen (U Richmond Law) and Heather Payne (Ohio State U (OSU) Michael E. Moritz College Law) have posted “Data Centers’ Data Problem” (72 Vill. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2027)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The rapid expansion of data centers to support artificial intelligence and cloud computing is reshaping the electric grid while exposing a fundamental weakness in the legal and regulatory framework that governs it. This Article identifies a previously overlooked problem at the heart of data center development: the absence of a comprehensive public information framework capable of generating and disseminating reliable data at the critical decision points that determine how data centers are planned, built, and powered. Information is fragmented across utilities, developers, regional transmission organizations, regulators, and local governments, while key project assumptions frequently remain confidential. These informational failures impede effective planning, prevent regulators and the public from determining whether data centers bear the costs they impose on the electric grid, and undermine meaningful public participation in decisions with profound consequences for the grid’s future.

The Article argues that existing voluntary disclosures and other proposed means of addressing data gaps cannot remedy these deficiencies. It therefore proposes the creation of a national public registry for data center development administered by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The registry would provide a continuously updated, centralized repository of standardized project information, furnishing the public with the information necessary to evaluate proposed projects before critical decisions become effectively irreversible. The Article concludes that this form of information governance is an indispensable prerequisite to ensuring that the rapid growth of data centers advances reliability, affordability, and sound energy policy.

Aranovich et al. on Who Gets to See What? Information Asymmetry and the Limits of Transparency in Australia’s Medical AI Regulation

Tatiana Aranovich (Macquarie U) et al. have posted “Who Gets to See What? Information Asymmetry and the Limits of Transparency in Australia’s Medical AI Regulation” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly embedded in Australian healthcare, from diagnosis to patient monitoring. These technologies promise more accessible and accurate care but introduce significant safety risks. Much of this technology is also delivered through publicly funded care, which gives its transparency a public dimension alongside its clinical safety one. Transparency is widely promoted as a response to address these risks, yet little attention has been paid to whether existing medical device regulation delivers meaningful transparency (understood here as a concept distinct from explainability) for different stakeholders. This article evaluates the Australian framework through the complementary concepts of information asymmetry and meaningful transparency. Using doctrinal analysis, it maps how information flows to three principal audiences — regulators, users, and the public including independent experts — and evaluates each pathway against three criteria: accessibility, relevance and auditability. The article finds that transparency is distributed unevenly: strong to the regulator, weaker to users, and weakest to the public. It proposes a three-pillar reform agenda targeting user-facing relevance, public auditability, and the institutional translation of regulatory information into clinical practice.

Bommarito et al. on Governing AI Agents: Risk, Compliance, and Accountability in Law and Finance

Jillian Bommarito (273 Ventures) et al. have posted “Governing AI Agents: Risk, Compliance, and Accountability in Law and Finance” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Agentic AI systems—capable of autonomous goal pursuit, environmental perception, and iterative action—are rapidly entering legal and financial services, yet existing governance frameworks were not designed for software that acts rather than merely responds. Unlike passive AI tools, agentic systems can stray from their intended objectives and take consequential actions without human approval, creating risks that traditional compliance models often fail to address. This chapter proposes a governance framework that can be used to scale oversight requirements to match each system’s risk profile, based on factors like degree of autonomy, how long it operates, whose interests it serves, and how its objectives are set and modified. The framework situates agentic AI within a five-layer regulatory stack encompassing foundational law, professional ethics, sector-specific regulation, emerging AI-specific rules (including the EU AI Act), and voluntary assurance standards such as NIST and SOC 2.

The chapter argues that in law and finance—industries built on trust and non-delegable professional duties—human-in-the-loop and human-in-command architectures are not merely best practices but critical designs for satisfying fiduciary and regulatory obligations. To operationalize accountability without fragmenting ownership, the chapter evaluates three organizational models—centralized, federated, and embedded—and demonstrates how responsibility-assignment tools such as RACI matrices can allocate oversight duties with precision. It concludes by outlining a maturity-based adoption path that enables legal and financial institutions to adopt agentic AI while managing liability exposure and reputational risk.

Szostak et al. on Mind the Competitiveness Gap: Measuring the AI Act’s Extraterritorial Reach

Kamil Szostak (Maastricht U) et al. have posted “Mind the Competitiveness Gap: Measuring the AI Act’s Extraterritorial Reach” (Computer Law & Security Review, volume 62, 2026[10.1016/j.clsr.2026.106357]) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The 2024 EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) asserts broad extraterritorial scope: it applies to any AI system whose output is used in the EU, no matter where the company behind the AI is located. The AI Act reflects a wider trend of the EU extending its legislation beyond its borders. But does this mean companies actually comply with the AI Act? And do compliance levels differ between companies based inside and outside of the EU? Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of extraterritorial legislation has so far been limited, focusing mostly on privacy and consumer protection law. This paper provides such evidence by assessing demonstrated compliance with the AI Act’s prohibitions on certain AI practices under Article 5(1), for which high financial penalties started to apply in August 2025. To this end, this study analysed terms of service and acceptable use policies from 53 AI companies. Results indicate that foreign companies without EU subsidiaries rarely comply, with little improvements following the introduction of penalties. Only around 14% of such companies refer to the AI Act’s prohibitions in their documents, whereas significantly more companies with an EU establishment do so. This may result from limited (extraterritorial) enforcement and uncertainty among non-EU companies about the AI Act’s scope. The findings suggest that EU companies may face a competitive disadvantage compared with foreign firms. This concern is highly relevant to current debates on the competitiveness of EU firms and the potential need for legislative simplification.

Lee on Why AI Governance Fails Without a Legal and Scientific Definition of Consciousness

Jinho Lee (Salpida Institute Consciousness Science (SICS)) has posted “Why AI Governance Fails Without a Legal and Scientific Definition of Consciousness” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Artificial intelligence governance is widely recognized as one of the most urgent challenges of the twenty-first century. Governments, international organizations, and technology institutions have proposed ethical guidelines, legal frameworks, and safety principles intended to regulate increasingly autonomous AI systems. Yet despite unprecedented attention, AI governance continues to fail in practice. This paper argues that these failures are not primarily technological, political, or ethical in nature. Rather, AI governance fails because it is constructed upon an undefined and scientifically ungrounded concept of consciousness. Current legal and ethical frameworks implicitly rely on assumptions about intention, agency, responsibility, alignment, and decision-making-concepts that presuppose consciousness-while refusing to define consciousness in any measurable, operational, or legally interoperable manner. As a result, AI governance collapses into abstraction, cultural conflict, and non-enforceable norms. This paper reframes AI governance failure as a definition failure rather than a policy failure, and demonstrates why no durable AI governance system can exist without a shared legal and scientific definition of consciousness. This work functions as a diagnostic and connective document. It does not introduce new measurement models or governance mechanisms. Instead, it explains why such models are structurally required, and situates AI governance within a broader civilizational transition toward operationally defined consciousness systems already established in the Consciousness Civilization Framework (CCF) and its constitutional and operational records.

Fagan on Training Data Governance

Frank Fagan (South Texas College Law Houston) has posted “Training Data Governance” (NYU Journal of Intellectual Property & Entertainment Law, Vol. 15, pp. 227-64 (2026)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

As AI-generated summaries increasingly displace traditional search results, users are less likely to visit the underlying websites where content is published. This shift has sharply reduced traffic to those sites, threatening the economic viability of content creators and prompting a wave of paywalls, restrictions, and litigation. With referral-based revenue in decline, the continued supply of high-quality content faces mounting risk, precisely as generative AI has grown more dependent on such material. This tension, between innovation and sustainability, frames the central legal and policy inquiry of training data governance: how to preserve access to essential AI training inputs without undermining the incentives to produce them.

This Article examines licensing as a tool of training-data governance and focuses on the practical question of when content loss threatens model performance and reduces social welfare. The inquiry centers on whether withdrawal of high-value material is likely and whether voluntary bargaining can realistically prevent it. Where the risk of withdraw is low, additional protection is unnecessary; where the risk is substantial and bargaining fails, a narrowly tailored fallback, such as a standardized, non-exclusive license, can preserve access without disturbing fair-use doctrine or existing private arrangements. This welfare logic is implemented through a three-part test: licensing is warranted only when (1) the content has demonstrable value for AI training, (2) withdrawal is the rational market outcome absent remuneration, and (3) voluntary licensing fails due to transaction costs or bargaining frictions. Together, these conditions ensure that intervention occurs only where it improves overall welfare relative to the status quo.