Chen on Two Roads Diverge and Converge in the AI Era: Computer-Generated Works as an Exception for Human Authorship?

Yang Chen (Law) has posted “Two Roads Diverge and Converge in the AI Era: Computer-Generated Works as an Exception for Human Authorship?” (36 Columbia Journal of Asian Law (forthcoming)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The intersection of copyright law and artificial intelligence (AI) presents numerous unresolved challenges, while the copyrightability of AI-generated content (AIGC) is particularly complex. Jurisdictions have adopted distinct approaches that converge and diverge in addressing this matter. Classic human authorship jurisdictions, such as the United States (US), China, and the European Union (EU), require AIGC to satisfy human authorship and originality requirements to be copyrightable. As a result, their debates focus on the level of original authorial contributions required for AIGC protection. In contrast, jurisdictions following the computer-generated works (CGWs) doctrine, such as the United Kingdom (UK) and Hong Kong (HK), diverge significantly when applying a plain interpretation approach. These jurisdictions treat AIGC as copyrightable subject matter regardless of originality standard, even though they also generally follow the human authorship requirement. The convergences and divergences among these jurisdictions make their comparison particularly valuable to explore.

To unpack this convergence and divergence, the article first examines relevant scholarly debates and recent legal developments in classic human authorship jurisdictions (represented by the US, China, and the EU) that illustrate how they address the copyrightability of AIGC. It then explores the CGWs doctrine in jurisdictions such as the UK and HK, highlighting how their approaches may differ significantly. In light of these divergences, particularly under a plain interpretation approach, the article argues that the divergent stance adopted by CGWs jurisdictions is doctrinally problematic and lacks theoretical justification. The article proposes a refined doctrinal approach to the CGWs doctrine that aligns more closely with the frameworks in human authorship jurisdictions regarding AIGC protection. While some divergences may persist, this refined approach establishes a more reasonable and justifiable framework, fostering greater convergence between the two systems.

This comparative analysis offers insights on unified pathways forward for jurisdictions navigating AI and copyright. These pathways include developing a more reasonable originality standard for AIGC, exploring limitations on AIGC copyright protection, and acknowledging the diminishing role of copyright law in the AI era. This recognition of the diminishing role underscores the need for alternative solutions beyond the traditional copyright regime to address emerging challenges more directly and efficiently.

Atkinson on In the Mood to Exclude: Revitalizing Trespass to Chattels in the Era of GenAI Scraping

David Atkinson (The U Texas Austin) has posted “In the Mood to Exclude: Revitalizing Trespass to Chattels in the Era of GenAI Scraping” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

GenAI companies are strip-mining the web. Their scraping bots harvest content at an unprecedented scale, circumventing technical barriers to fuel billion-dollar models while creators typically receive nothing. Courts have enabled this exploitation by misunderstanding what property rights protect online. The prevailing view treats websites as mere repositories of intellectual property and dismisses trespass claims absent server damage. That framework grants AI companies presumptive access while ignoring the economic devastation they inflict. But the content is severable from the website itself. The key contribution of this paper is to reframe the debate: websites are personal property subject to the same exclusionary rights as physical chattels. When scrapers bypass access controls and divert traffic that sustains a website’s value, they commit actionable trespass. The law need not create new protections; it need only apply existing property principles to digital space.

Courts and litigants have struggled to police unwanted, large-scale scraping because copyright preemption often narrows available claims, leaving copyright and its fair use defense as the primary battleground. Trespass to chattels offers a superior path, grounded in the right to exclude unwanted intrusions. Reviving this tort would protect not only content creators but also the digital ecosystem. Such protection would discourage exploitative scraping, preserve incentives for content creation, help protect privacy and personal data, and safeguard autonomy and expression. Reaffirming website owners’ right to exclude is essential to maintaining a fair and sustainable online environment.

Asay on Artificial Code

Clark D. Asay (Brigham Young U J. Reuben Clark Law) has posted “Artificial Code” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) has rapidly transformed software development, enabling the production of high-quality code at unprecedented speed and scale. Yet despite widespread litigation over the use of copyrighted works to train AI systems in fields such as music, journalism, and visual art, the software industry has thus far remained largely absent from the AI copyright wars. The explanation lies in the pervasiveness of free and open source software (FOSS), which has provided AI developers with a vast, low-risk corpus of training material while simultaneously insulating them from copyright liability. Ironically, however, the same AI technologies that have benefited from the FOSS ecosystem now threaten to undermine its legal and normative foundations.

The core issue, this Article contends, is that much AI-generated software-what this Article terms “artificial code”-is not eligible for copyright protection under prevailing U.S. law. Because copyright requires human authorship, artificial code often falls into the public domain, rendering traditional copyright-based FOSS licensing frameworks increasingly ineffective. As copyright recedes as a viable governance mechanism, software innovators are likely to turn instead to trade secrecy and patents to protect their software innovations. These alternative regimes, while legally robust, are often at odds with the openness, reciprocity, and collaborative norms that have long defined the modern software economy.

This shift has profound implications. As more software is withheld from public access or encumbered by exclusionary patent rights, the software commons risks contraction. In turn, the contraction of that commons threatens the future development of AI systems themselves. Generative models depend on continued access to large volumes of humancurated software to avoid degradation and “model collapse,” as well as inventive AI innovations. If the FOSS ecosystem erodes, AI systems may find themselves deprived of the very inputs necessary to sustain their progress.

By tracing the historical rise of FOSS, diagnosing the legal vulnerabilities introduced by artificial code, and examining the growing pull of alternative intellectual property regimes, this Article highlights a paradox at the heart of modern AI development: generative AI may be sowing the seeds of its own stagnation. The Article concludes by exploring how these concerns may arise in other creative contexts, too, as well as assessing possible responses aimed at preserving openness in software and AI innovation while accommodating the realities of AI-generated code.

Richards et al. on Why AI Preemption Would Be a Mistake: Testimony of Professor Richards before the US House Judiciary Committee

Neil M. Richards (Washington U Law) et al. have posted “Why AI Preemption Would Be a Mistake: Testimony of Professor Richards before the US House Judiciary Committee” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Congress has been considering pre-empting state laws that regulate AI for a variety of reasons. This comment argues that federal preemption of State AI laws would be a mistake for three reasons. First, AI is still in its early stages, and its potential harms and benefits are still uncertain. Preemption now of state laws touching AI would be reckless and leave consumers exposed to great harm. Second, state regulation, as opposed to federal regulation, has been the primary driver of sensible tech regulation over the past three decades of our Internet age. States have proven capable of adapting and reacting to these novel issues, and federal preemption now would prevent the states from being to respond and experiment to solve both current problem we know about, and future problems that have not yet become understood. Third, industry claims that state regulation stifles innovation are historically and empirically unsound. The states have proven effective at navigating technology regulation. They have done so in a manner that has helped foster the explosive growth of the American technology industry while also building out protections for, and thereby driving the confidence of, American consumers in these new technologies. Additionally, caution and measured action now does not preclude Congress’s taking up broad AI or technology bills in the future, when the dangers around these new technologies and the merits and costs of the various state approaches have become clearer. Broad preemption today would deprive our country of the kinds of state laws that will be essential to build the necessary trust that AI systems— like the internet before them—need to become widely adopted and fulfill their potential. Thus, preemption would be a danger to the kinds of broad adoption of useful AI technologies.

Velazquez et al. on The Divided States of Work Law: Regulating US Workplaces in the Age of AI

Alvin Velazquez (Indiana U Maurer Law) and Charlotte Garden (U Minnesota Law) have posted “The Divided States of Work Law: Regulating US Workplaces in the Age of AI” (in Artificial Intelligence and Labour Law: A Global Overview, M. Biasi, ed., Giappichelli/Routledge (forthcoming, 2026)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

United States labor policy is notable for how little it constrains most employers: unlike many jurisdictions represented in this volume, “atwill” employment is standard, and union density is low. In line with this general approach, federal lawmakers have not regulated AI or related technologies, either to plan for feared job displacements, or to limit the use of this technology to depress worker power through surveillance, discrimination, or other strategies. And while federal regulatory agencies previously took steps to bring existing law to bear in these new contexts, this approach is far from comprehensive. However, a handful of US state governments have shown greater willingness to regulate employers’ use of these emerging technologies – although their regulation occurs in the shadow of federal “preemption doctrine,” under which states are precluded from regulating some aspects of work law. This chapter explains why federal regulation of employers’ use of emerging technologies is unlikely and analyzes prospects for states to step into the breach.

Madsen et al. on The 7Vs of AI Slop: A Typology of Generative Waste

Dag Øivind Madsen (U South-Eastern Norway USN Business) and Richard W. Puyt (U Twente) have posted “The 7Vs of AI Slop: A Typology of Generative Waste” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The rise of generative artificial intelligence has introduced a new shorthand in digital culture: AI slop. The term refers to the flood of low-quality, machine-generated content that now saturates platforms, from generic essays and clickbait blogs to uncanny images, deepfake pornography, and synthetic video. This paper develops a typology of AI slop structured around seven dimensions-the 7Vs: Volume (scale of production), Velocity (speed of generation and circulation), Variety (range of forms and genres), Value (erosion of cultural and epistemic worth), Verification (problems of truth and trust), Visibility (algorithmic amplification), and Virality (meme-like diffusion). Together, these dimensions explain how generative waste proliferates, why it dominates attention economies, and what risks it poses to knowledge infrastructures, creative industries, and democratic publics. Situating AI slop within theories of platform capitalism, information overload, and epistemic pollution, the paper argues that slop is not a passing nuisance but a structural feature of contemporary media ecologies. The 7Vs provide a framework for analyzing generative waste across cultural, academic, commercial, political, and organizational domains, offering a foundation for future empirical and conceptual research into how societies can navigate and mitigate slop-saturated environments.

Fang on The Tragedy of the AI Data Commons: Legal Constraints and the Economics of AI Innovation

Max Fang (Indiana U Bloomington The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop Political Theory & Policy Analysis) has posted “The Tragedy of the AI Data Commons: Legal Constraints and the Economics of AI Innovation” (Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal, Vol. 34 (forthcoming, 2026).) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The exponential growth of artificial intelligence (AI) has brought data governance to the forefront of legal and economic debate. As global AI models hunger for massive datasets, the legal restrictions around data ownership, privacy, and intellectual property are increasingly shaping and fragmenting what kinds of data are available, how they are accessed, and who controls them. This article investigates the institutional structures governing AI data and poses the question of how privacy and intellectual property laws influence the availability and sustainability of AI training datasets. Through a comparative institutional analysis of U.S. and EU legal regimes, it employs law-and-economics methodologies and Ostrom’s theory to frame AI training data as a commons. The paper integrates doctrinal legal review with economic reasoning to evaluate how data governance institutions simultaneously protect and constrain innovation. The article introduces the concept of a “tragedy of the AI data commons,” and argues that current incentive misalignments between data protection and AI development may lead to under-contribution and eventual data scarcity. It contributes to institutional scholarship by reconceptualizing data governance as a resource allocation problem and calls for new self-governance frameworks that promote sustainable and equitable access to AI data while preserving fundamental rights.

Afek on Accuracy and Fluency: Understanding Hallucinations in Large Language Models

Ran Afek (Tel Aviv U) has posted “Accuracy and Fluency: Understanding Hallucinations in Large Language Models” on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in generating fluent, contextually appropriate text, yet they are inherently prone to hallucinations, producing outputs that appear plausible but are factually inaccurate. Drawing on the findings of Kalai et al. (2025), this paper examines how hallucinations arise, not merely from corrupted training data but from the intrinsic architecture and probabilistic nature of LLMs. This study highlights how statistical patterns learned from massive datasets underpin both the strengths and limitations of language generation models. Ultimately, LLMs favor conversational fluency over strict factual precision, reflecting the probabilistic and context-driven nature of human language itself.

Yoo et al. on U.S. Artificial Intelligence Regulation During the Biden Administration

Christopher S. Yoo (U Pennsylvania Carey Law) and Alex Mueller (U Pennsylvania Carey Law) have posted “U.S. Artificial Intelligence Regulation During the Biden Administration” (Journal of Law & Economic Regulation, Vol. 17, p.7, 2024) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The past four years have seen a notable evolution in the United States’ approach to regulating artificial intelligence (AI). Under the leadership of President Joseph Biden, the U.S. federal government has demonstrated a much greater willingness to address risks of harm posed by AI systems proactively. Yet in so doing, it has remained committed to fostering an environment conducive to innovation, continuing to show a preference for voluntary self-regulatory measures and sector-specific oversight rather than heavy handed interventions.

This article examines the major regulatory developments that have taken place during the Biden administration, including those at the federal level – such as the recent landmark Executive Order on AI, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) AI Risk Management Framework, and actions by specific agencies – as well as the flurry of legislative activity occurring at the state level. While questions remain about the long-term trajectory of AI regulation in the U.S., a clear governance framework has taken shape over the past four years that reflects a deliberate effort to balance safeguarding of public and national interests with the goals of promoting technological advancement and economic competitiveness.

Kildeev on Artificial Intelligence is Slave of the Lamp

Adel Kildeev (Zhdanov A. Leningrad State U) has posted “Artificial Intelligence is Slave of the Lamp” (Kildeev, Adel. Artificial Intelligence is Slave of the Lamp. Scientific Platform XXI Century, Issue 6 (September 2025), pp. 3-31 Published Version. http://www.episs.ru) on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This paper is the published version of the article “Artificial Intelligence is Slave of the Lamp” appearing in Scientific Platform XXI Century. The article offers a legal-philosophical analysis of artificial intelligence and demonstrates that AI systems cannot be considered legal subjects under any classical or modern doctrine. Building on Roman law and contemporary theories of legal personality, the paper argues that AI constitutes a special object of law-a digital analogue of the instrumentum vocale, the “speaking tool.” The article critiques proposals for electronic personhood, evaluates major regulatory approaches (EU AI Act, UN initiatives, US/China frameworks), and concludes by proposing a UN Convention on Artificial Intelligence. AI possesses no volition, intention, or legal agency: it remains a tool-a “slave of the lamp.